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This paper investigates the effect of financial incentives on student performance 
and analyzes for the first time how the incentive effect in education is moderated 
by students’ risk and time preferences. To examine this interaction we use a 
natural experiment that we combine with data from surveys and economic 
experiments on risk and time preferences. We not only find that students who are 
offered financial incentives for better grades have on average better first- and 
second-year grade point averages, but more importantly, we find that highly 
impatient students respond more strongly to financial incentives than less 
impatient students. This finding suggests that financial incentives are most 
effective if they solve educational problems of myopic students. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The past decade has seen a major proliferation of school interventions to encourage 
students to increase their school achievement. As increased human capital accumulation 
contributes positively to the welfare of and the equality within societies, the underlying aim of 
these interventions is obvious. Not surprisingly, a growing empirical literature investigates the 
role of incentives in education in general (see, e.g., Gneezy et al., 2011 for an overview) and the 
role of financial incentives for student performance in particular (see, e.g., Fryer, 2012 for an 
overview). Quasi-experimental and experimental studies evaluate financial incentive programs 
designed to improve student performance. These studies typically find small average program 
effects, if any at all (for secondary and post-secondary education, see, among others, Angrist et 
al., 2009; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Fryer, 2011; Leuven et al., 2010). Nonetheless, their findings 
suggest that while such programs can have positive effects for certain groups of students, they 
can have no or even negative effects for other groups of students. Thus far, relatively little is 
known about the reasons for these heterogeneous behavioral responses to financial incentive 
programs in education.  
Whether students increase their school performance in response to a financial incentive 
program is clearly an intertemporal choice, in which the timing of costs and benefits (of an 
increased learning investment) are spread over time (Becker, 1962). To analyze how financial 
incentives in education affect this intertemporal choice, it is necessary to include measures of 
students’ economic preferences (e.g., Frederick et al., 2002; Keren and Roelofsma, 1995; Prelec 
and Loewenstein, 1991). Preferences vary considerably among students (Castillo et al., 2011; 
Dave et al., 2010), and recent literature has pointed to non-cognitive abilities (including 
economic preferences) as being systematically related to school achievement (Cunha and 
Heckman, 2010; Duckworth and Seligman, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006). Therefore, that 
incentive effects in education interact with economic preferences—meaning that differences in 
preferences might affect students’ responses to financial incentives in education—might not be 
surprising. 
In this paper we analyze the effect of the existence of financial incentive programs on 
student performance by considering interactions of the incentive effect with two important 
economic preferences: students’ time and risk preferences. We derive our hypotheses by applying 
standard human capital theory (Becker, 1962; Bishop, 2006). To empirically investigate the effect 
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of the performance pay program (PPP) on student performance and to assess whether, and if so, 
how the program effect depends on economic preferences, we collected a unique and 
comprehensive dataset. It includes information on both student performance (measured by end-
of-semester grade point averages) and student economic preference parameters (measured when 
students started their vocational education program). These data are available within a school 
environment where some of the students are part of school-independent PPPs and some are not. 
The PPPs take the form of a natural experiment. This unique combination of data allows us to 
contribute in two major ways to the existing body of evidence on financial incentives in 
education: Most importantly, we examine the link between the effect of financial incentives and 
students’ economic preferences. We thus shed light on some of the fundamentals of students’ 
response to financial incentives. Moreover, we analyze the program effect in a school 
environment, i.e., in vocational education, where it has not yet been analyzed.  
Our paper provides two main findings. First, empirical results indicate that, on average, the 
existence of PPPs significantly increases the performance of students in upper secondary 
vocational education (by approximately 0.35 standard deviations). This average effect is the 
result of fundamental differences in findings among students in different occupational subgroups. 
For one of the two occupational subgroups, i.e., students in technical occupations, we find a 
statistically significant and highly positive program effect (0.55 – 0.65 standard deviations). For 
the other subgroup, i.e., students in commercial occupations, we find a zero program effect. In the 
latter case, the actual fraction of students in a PPP is insufficiently large, and data are thus not 
persuasive to reject the hypothesis of no program effect.  
Second, for the interaction between financial incentives and economic preferences, our 
findings suggest that program effects differ across students with heterogeneous preferences. For 
students’ time preferences our findings suggest that relatively impatient students increase their 
performance far more when financial incentives are offered. For students’ risk preferences, our 
results are less convincing, leading us to suspect that risk loving students respond less to the PPP 
than relatively risk averse students. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents hypotheses. Section 3 describes details of the PPP, provides information on the 
elicitation of economic preferences, and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides the 
empirical strategy and Section 5 presents results for both the pure program and the interaction 
effects. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Hypotheses 
 
According to human capital theory (Becker, 1962; Bishop, 2006), students decide about 
their time and effort devoted to learning activities by comparing the present discounted value of 
the benefits (i.e., expected advantageous labor market outcomes, such as higher future earnings or 
lower unemployment risk)
1
 to the present discounted value of the costs (i.e., direct and indirect 
costs of exerting learning effort). Ceteris paribus, the theory predicts that students raise their 
school performance when their marginal net benefit increases, i.e., when monetary incentives for 
better student performance are provided. We thus derive our first hypothesis: The provision of 
financial incentives to students with good school performance increases their performance 
(everything else being constant).
2
  
Nonetheless, given that the timing of the investment costs and benefits are spread over time, 
the relationship between financial incentives and student performance is not straightforward. 
Further applications or complements of theories on human capital investments have strengthened 
the argument that the decision to invest in human capital depends on individual economic 
preferences, i.e., on risk and time preferences in particular (for risk preferences, see Brunello, 
2002; Levhari and Weiss, 1974; for time preferences, see Blinder and Weiss, 1976; Borghans and 
Golsteyn, 2006). Considering significant heterogeneity in preferences among individuals (e.g., 
Harrison et al., 2002; Rabin, 1998) and among students in particular (e.g., Dave et al., 2010) we 
expect that incentive effects in education interact with economic preferences. 
Given heterogeneity in time preferences among students (as shown previously, for example 
by Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Castillo et al., 2011), not only the expected size but also the 
timing of the return on investment is crucial for students’ decision-making process. Students who 
overly discount the future, i.e., impatient students, choose to invest too little time and effort in 
                                                        
1 Same as Manski and Wise (1983), we assume that students form their expectation about returns to schooling as a function of the 
average test scores achieved in college. Empirical studies have shown that not only the schooling degree but also student 
performance (e.g., grade point averages) positively affect long-term labor market outcomes (e.g., Jones and Jackson, 1990; Roth 
and Clarke, 1998). In German-speaking countries, where applications always include academic records, school performance 
matters for labor market entrance in particular (see Schweri, 2004 for Switzerland).  
2 Referring to psychological and economic literature, one could as well hypothesize the opposite. According to psychological 
literature (e.g., Deci, 1971; Deci et al., 1999) or recent economic literature (e.g., Frey, 1994), the provision of incentives may also 
reduce individual performance due to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation. It remains mostly an empirical question whether 
financial incentives have a positive or negative effect on student performance. Existing studies on financial incentives in 
education have addressed the concern of crowding out effects; however, thus far they have found no evidence for lower intrinsic 
motivation of incentivized students (e.g., Fryer, 2011; Kremer et al., 2009). We add to the existing empirical literature on 
incentives in education and provide evidence on some of the fundamentals of students’ response to financial incentives in 
education. 
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their own education when they highly discount time lagged investment benefits (Becker, 1975).
3
 
Generally, benefits from higher student performance are derived only in the long run. With the 
provision of financial incentives the waiting period for parts of the benefits becomes reduced. 
The incentives thus boost discounted marginal benefits from higher student performance, 
especially for impatient students. Conversely, for patient students, perceived marginal benefits 
change only slightly (if at all), as the size of the short-term incentive is smaller than the size of 
discounted long-term labor market benefits. Therefore, short-term incentives should particularly 
encourage the group of impatient students to increase their school performance (as already 
speculated by authors of related studies, such as Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Castillo et al., 2011; 
Fryer, 2011). We thus derive our second hypothesis: When students receive short-term rewards, 
relatively impatient students increase their school performance more than relatively patient 
students. 
Just as investors in financial capital, investors in human capital are also concerned about 
the certainty and risk of the returns of an investment (Brunello, 2002; Krebs, 2003; Levhari and 
Weiss, 1974). Students who are relatively more risk averse choose to invest less in education 
when the benefits thereof are uncertain. Following Köszegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that 
students (will) value the new bundle of monetary benefits derived from the investment in higher 
school performance in comparison to their initial expectations about the value of benefits. The 
initial expectations refer to long-term labor market benefits, which, we argue, have at least two 
sources of uncertainty (similar arguments are made by Levhari and Weiss, 1974). First, benefits 
are determined by exogenous factors (such as changes in demand and supply for labor, new 
developments in technology or structural changes). Second, information about future benefits is 
limited, because students do not know today whether and, if so, how much a prospective 
employer will value increased school performance. With the provision of financial incentives, 
students have the possibility of reaping part of the investment benefits with a relatively higher 
certainty: First, benefits arise more immediately and are thus not as much exposed to exogenous 
future shocks. Second, the relationship between increased student performance and the additional 
monetary benefit is clear and provided by the rules of the incentive program. The provision of 
comparatively certain rewards thus increases perceived marginal benefits especially for the group 
of relatively risk averse students who value these certain benefits more than they value the long-
                                                        
3 Among others, Harrison et al. (2002) provide empirical evidence for this purely theoretical statement finding that individuals 
with longer investments in education have substantially lower discounting rates. 
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term, relatively uncertain benefits. Therefore, financial incentives should particularly encourage 
the group of risk averse students to improve their school performance. We thus derive our third 
hypothesis: When students receive short-term rewards, relatively risk loving students increase 
their student performance less than relatively risk averse students. 
 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
To investigate whether financial incentives affect student performance, we collect data on 
265 students who are both part-time students and part-time employees as part of their upper 
secondary vocational education (a “dual” education). In this educational environment we make 
use of school-independent PPP, in which some students participate and others do not. Our student 
sample started their dual education program in late summer 2009, with an average age of 16 years. 
At this point, we collected
4
 both experimental and very detailed background survey data (such as 
date of birth, gender, parental schooling, language at home, and single grades achieved in their 
previous school, i.e., compulsory lower secondary education). In late summer 2010 and 2011, we 
conducted follow-up surveys collecting data on first- and second-year (end-of-semester) grade 
point averages (GPAs), among others, and details on the PPPs. To investigate heterogeneous 
program effects by student preferences, we combine these field data with experimentally elicited 
data on student preferences. 
In the following three subsections, we first outline the PPP (in dual vocational education) 
that we use in our study. Second, we describe the measurements of economic preferences, and 
third, we provide key student characteristics of the program and comparison groups. 
 
3.1 Performance pay programs under the Swiss dual education 
 
Students in our sample take part in dual education programs in the vocational education and 
training (VET) system in Switzerland.
5
 Students study part-time at school and at the same time 
work part-time as apprentices in a “host” company to train their practical skills. Some of these 
host companies have institutionalized a performance pay program (PPP), in which they pay 
                                                        
4 We collected this data for a joint project with Michael Kosfeld, Holger Herz, and Donata Bessey. In this project we investigate 
the rationality of students' decision to drop out of vocational education. The project is work in progress. 
5 Attending a VET program is the most popular way of gaining a basic education in Switzerland (OPET, 2011). Graduates from a 
VET program hold qualifications that are highly valued by employers in the Swiss labor market and generally enjoy a low risk of 
unemployment (OPET, 2010). 
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students bonuses for good end-of-semester GPAs achieved in vocational schools.
6
 Students who 
work in a host company offering a PPP thus have the opportunity to earn bonuses for good GPAs, 
whereas students who work in host companies with no PPP do not earn bonuses for good GPAs. 
Therefore, the first group can be seen as a treatment group and the second group as a comparison 
group.  
In many companies, the maximum achievable yearly bonus equals almost an average 
monthly apprentice wage (which is around 1’100 Swiss Francs (CHF) in the second year of 
vocational education
7
). Companies pay their students different bonus sizes, according to the level 
of the individual GPA. In most cases, bonuses are paid twice a year. Compared to the incentives 
in existing studies (e.g., Angrist et al., 2009; Fryer, 2011; Leuven et al., 2010), incentives in this 
case are paid over a longer period, i.e., throughout the years that the students remain in the dual 
education program. As the structure of the PPPs differs by company, our estimation results will 
capture the incentive effect produced by the pure existence of PPPs in host companies, as 
opposed to the non-existence of PPPs. 
Regardless of whether students work for a host company with an established PPP, students 
attend the same schools, sit in the same classrooms, and attend the same classes. Attendance is 
mandatory for all classes, with no option for class substitution. Given the nature of this 
experimental setting, we are able to compare students’ academic performance (i.e., end-of-
semester GPAs) for both the program and the comparison groups. To draw a causal comparison 
of student performance between the program and the comparison groups we make two key 
identifying assumptions: First, we assume that a student’s host company choice is not determined 
by the offer of PPPs. Second, we assume that which companies offer PPPs and which do not is 
very idiosyncratic, approximating randomization from a student perspective. Descriptive statistics 
will show that our identifying assumptions yield balanced program and comparison groups of 
students. In the following two paragraphs, we further discuss the origin of our identifying 
assumptions by providing insights into the students’ host company choice process and by 
explaining how school allocation is regimented. 
                                                        
6 Host companies have an interest in incentivizing students’ school performance as the school curriculum covers theoretical 
knowledge that is complementary to the practical work that students carry out at work. Host companies that belong to trade 
associations determine the school curriculum ensuring that it is up to date and matches the host companies’ latest requirements 
(OPET, 2011). 
7 The apprentice wage is higher for students in commercial occupations (average category ranges from 1’200 to 1’300 CHF) than 
for students in technical occupations (average category ranges from 900 to 1’000 CHF). 
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In Switzerland, the vocational education and training program is provided at the upper-
secondary level, with different vocational education and training programs offered. The most 
popular training program is the dual-track program, which consists of part-time studies at a 
vocational school and a part-time apprenticeship at a host company. The apprenticeship positions 
are specifically created for the vocational education and training program, and voluntarily offered 
by host companies, which thereby ensure a consistent supply of qualified workers. Host 
companies post their apprenticeship openings in regional newspapers, on their own websites, or 
on online job websites, just as they do for any other job opening. To our best knowledge, those 
advertisements do not include information on whether the company offers a PPP or not. Students 
who wish to enter the apprenticeship market apply for these positions in their desired field, i.e., in 
the occupation they plan to study. While we do not observe host companies selection process, we 
have information on student characteristics for both program and comparison group students. 
Descriptive statistics will show that the characteristics of students who work in a host company 
offering a PPP do not differ from the characteristics of comparison group students. 
Host companies offer the best-matching students an apprenticeship contract, which 
terminates with the completion of the training program. Once this contract is signed, host 
companies are required to register the contract at the cantonal (state) government office, which 
controls and approves apprenticeship contracts. Following strict governmental regulations, host 
companies enroll students in vocational schools. All vocational schools in Switzerland are public 
and offer the same quality of the educational content. School allocation depends on the location 
of the host company, with no option for choosing a different school. Both schools and host 
companies train students according to a uniform, clearly defined curriculum and national 
qualification procedures (OPET, 2011) that regulate not only the school but also the working 
hours. Therefore, our student population is assigned to their schools purely on the regional 
location of the host company. 
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3.2 Experimental elicitation of economic preference parameters 
 
For the measurement of economic preference parameters, we use standard decision-making 
experiments, which we implemented in the classroom within a month of the starting date.
8
 Our 
experiments consist of two main parts: In one part we elicit students’ time preferences; in the 
other, we measure students’ risk preferences.9 The original tables and instructions are available 
from the authors upon request. 
In the first part of the experiment, we elicited students’ time preference by means of two 
payoff tables. Each table contained a series of 20 payoff alternatives at different times. For each 
alternative, students made their choices, starting from the first row at the top of the table: While 
the delayed payments were always 100 CHF, the earlier payments ranged from 5 to 100 CHF 
with increments of 5 CHF moving down the table. For the first table, students chose between 
payments today and payments in 3 months. The second table differs from the first only in the 
timing of the payments: The students chose between payments in 3 months and payments in 6 
months. We identify students’ degree of time preference by the point at which students switch 
from the delayed payment of 100 CHF to the earlier option. The lower the value of the switch 
point, the less patient a student is.  
In the second part of the experiment, we measured students’ risk preference by using 
choices between a paid lottery and safe payments in a sequence of 10 binary choices. The lottery 
was the same for all choices: Students won either 10 CHF or nothing, depending on the coin toss. 
The safe payments increased in value for each choice from 1 to 10 CHF.
10
 We identify students’ 
degree of risk preference by the point at which students switch from the lottery (10 CHF with 
p=0.5) to the save option. The lower the value of the save option at the switch point, the more 
risk averse the student is. As the expected value of the lottery is 5 CHF, only risk loving students 
should favor the lottery options when the safe options are greater than 5 CHF. In contrast, risk 
averse students should always favor safe options smaller or equal to 5 CHF. 
Before we started the experiments, we informed students that after the experiments, their 
notional chosen payments would turn into real payments if their tables were drawn in a lottery. 
We thus incentivized students to express their true individual preferences. For the experiment in 
which we elicited time preferences, we selected two students in each school class for payment at 
                                                        
8 Participation bias appears unlikely, given compulsory schooling attendance. 
9 Notable examples of studies that use a similar approach (i.e., multiple price lists) to measure time preferences, risk preferences, 
or both are Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010; Harrison et al., 2002; and Meier and Sprenger, 2010. 
10 The last row had no relevance for the measurement of risk aversion; we included it to test that students understood the task. 
  - 10 - 
random. For those students who won the lottery, we randomly selected one row on the choice 
sheet as relevant for the payment. For the experiment in which we measured risk preferences, we 
randomly selected one row for payment for each student. After the experimental session ended, 
we either executed payments immediately or provided an official letter guaranteeing payments in 
the future.  
According to recent evidence for temporal stability of preferences (see Meier and Sprenger, 
2010 for time preferences; see Andersen et al., 2008 for risk preferences), we assume that student 
preferences remain static at least for the period of our analysis. 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics and covariate balance 
 
Our baseline sample (collected in 2009) includes information on 265 students from 14 
complete school classes in three public vocational schools.
11
 Students in our sample are trained 
for three to four years in either commercial or technical occupations (i.e., commercial employees, 
electricians or polytechnicians).
12
 Whereas students in technical occupations learn specific skills 
for technical production (e.g., how to set up complex electrical wiring systems or how to 
fabricate work pieces and tools required in the production industry), students in commercial 
occupations learn a broad knowledge of skills for carrying out administrative work in various 
fields and industries. 
In 2010, 90% of the students in our baseline sample (245 of 265) completed the first 
follow-up survey. In this paper, we discuss data only for students who reported valid and 
complete information on both the first-year GPA variable and the control variables of interest.
13
 
This adjusted sample, which we call the “first-year sample”, includes 200 students, one third (N = 
65) of whom work for a host company with an established PPP. In 2011, 84% of the students in 
our first-year sample (167 of 200) completed the second follow-up survey, reporting valid and 
complete information on both the second-year GPA variable and the control variables of interest. 
Twenty-eight percent of the students in the second-year sample (N = 46) report receiving 
performance pay in both the first and second years of vocational education. One might expect 
that program group students are more likely to be part of the second-year sample. We deal with 
this concern at the bottom of Table 1: Figures indicate that the selection of students in the second-
                                                        
11 These schools are located in the greater region of Zurich, which is the largest Swiss city, located in the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland. 
12 These three occupations are among the top 10 of the 230 occupations where training programs in Switzerland are offered 
(OPET, 2011). 
13 Students that did not understand the task of the economic experiments (14/265) are also excluded in our sample. 
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year sample is independent of the treatment status. Additionally, we tested whether the 
participation in the second-year sample is determined by students’ economic preferences. We 
find no connection between a student’s second-year sample status and her or his economic 
preferences. 
Table 1 presents student characteristics sorted by four subgroups. The first subgroup covers 
personal characteristics: age, gender, and native speaker dummy. The second subgroup covers 
ability measurements: a dummy for whether or not mothers hold a higher education degree, math 
grade at the end of lower secondary education, and a dummy for ever having repeated a grade.
14
 
The third subgroup covers the company characteristic. “Number of employees” is the only 
variable available in our data for describing company characteristics. The variable is a dummy 
indicating whether or not a student is working for a host company with 100 employees or more. 
The fourth subgroup covers students’ economic preference parameters. The dummy “risk loving” 
(as opposed to being risk averse or risk neutral) indicates whether a student is willing to take risk 
or not. Risk loving students still prefer the lottery options when the expected value of the lottery 
option is smaller than the value of the safe option. In contrast to the unequivocal identification of 
risk loving students, there is no such clear-cut way of defining the group of relatively impatient 
(or patient) students. We create dummies of extreme characteristics of time preferences to 
increase statistical power when we include those dummies in our regression analysis. The dummy 
“super-impatient” refers to the 10th or 25th percentile of students who are always impatient, i.e., 
who are impatient either at the 10
th
 or 25
th
 percentile in both choice sets. Impatient students prefer 
a small amount of money today (in three months) than 100 CHF in three months (six months).
15
 
One way of testing our identifying assumption is by comparing student characteristics of 
program and comparison groups. We thus report both means for the comparison group and 
differences in means for the program group for the variables within the four described subgroups 
(see columns 1 and 2 in table 1). Differences in means are reported as coefficients. Those 
coefficients are the results of regressions of each of the students’ characteristics (e.g., age or 
gender) against the treatment status controlling for school and school classes. Displayed figures 
are in accordance with our identifying assumptions: The program and comparison groups appear 
balanced along observable dimensions. None of the reported differences in student 
                                                        
14 Our dataset includes further ability measurements; however, either these measurements do not help explain the variance in GPA, 
or their inclusion would further reduce our sample size. 
15 Whereas the 10th percentile of super-impatient students prefers 45 CHF or less today (in three months) over 100 CHF in three 
months (and six months, respectively); the 25th percentile of super-impatient students prefers 50 CHF or less today (and 60 CHF 
or less in three months) over 100 CHF in three months (and six months, respectively). 
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characteristics—neither the variables themselves nor the variables as a subgroup—is statistically 
significant. 
Program group differences for our first subgroup, personal characteristics, are not 
statistically significant. Descriptive statistics show that students entered the vocational program at 
an average age of 16, the traditional age for starting the program. A smaller fraction of students is 
female (40%), a percentage driven by the male-dominated technical occupations. A large 
proportion of students are native-German speaking (83%). Within the second subgroup, program 
group differences for each of the ability measurement are positive but also not statistically 
significant, indicating comparable ability levels among the program and comparison groups. 
Likewise for the third subgroup, the company size dummy, the difference between the program 
and comparison groups is not statistically significant. The same is true for the fourth subgroup, 
i.e., the economic preference dummies. Descriptive statistics show that, on average, 36% of the 
students have risk preferences consistent with being risk loving. The fraction of risk loving 
students is rather high, given that individuals are generally found to be risk averse (e.g., Dohmen 
et al., 2010). In our experiment, however, offered stakes were relatively low in size, possibly 
causing students to make risky decisions with a higher probability (Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and 
Laury, 2002). For time preferences, only 16% (9%) of the students match our description of 
being super-impatient defined as the 25
th
 (10
th
) percentile of students who are impatient in both 
choice sets.  
We further test the balance between the program and comparison groups by plotting 
students’ math grades in lower secondary education, i.e., before students had the opportunity to 
participate in a performance pay program. Panel A in Fig. 1 shows the distribution of math grades 
for the program group, along with the distribution of math grades for the comparison group. For 
comparison, we normalized grades so that they are distributed with a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. The plot indicates that the distribution of math grades before the start of the 
program is similar for both groups. As our descriptive statistics already indicate, the two groups 
appear balanced in terms of their ability level. 
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Comparison Group 
Mean
PPP Group 
Difference
(1) (2)
Number of observations 135 65
Personal characteristics
Age 16.333 -0.049
at entrance in vocational education [0.961] (0.174)
Female 0.519 -0.033
[0.501] (0.070)
Native speaker 0.874 -0.072
[0.333] (0.070)
F-test for joint significance 0.47
{0.705}
Ability measurements
Mother - higher education 0.163 0.023
[0.370] (0.074)
Math grade average (2009) -0.073 0.050
standardized [1.047] (0.192)
Ever repeated grade (2009) 0.156 0.083
[0.363] (0.071)
F-test for joint significance 0.5
{0.681}
Company characteristic
Number of employees 0.467 0.131
(dummy equals 1 if the number of employees >= 100) [0.500] (0.093)
Economic preference parameters
Risk-loving 0.326 0.127
(2009) [0.470] (0.094)
Super-impatient (25 percentile) 0.141 -0.001
(2009) [0.349] (0.068)
Super-impatient (10 percentile) 0.067 0.002
(2009) [0.250] (0.052)
F-test for joint significance 0.62
{0.602}
Second-year sample
Being in the second-year sample 0.822 -0.023
[0.383] (0.071)
Covariate balance.
Table 1
Notes: "Comparison group mean" column reports averages and standard deviations in square-
brackets. "PPP Group Difference" column reports coefficients and robust standard errors in 
parentheses. These coefficients are the results of regressions of each variable on the treatment 
dummy including school and class controls. Within the subgroup of variables we present F-
tests for joint significance of all treatment differences. P-values for F-tests are in curly braces. 
Significance levels:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15
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Panel B and C in Fig. 1 provide a preview of our results by plotting the distributions of 
standardized first- and second-year GPAs. The GPA variables are the averages of the grades 
achieved in each class attended during a school semester. Students in our sample attend classes 
according to a strictly defined school curriculum, in which class attendance is mandatory. 
Students reported their exact first- and second-year GPAs on a range from 1 to 6, with 4 to 6 as 
passing grades. In panel B we plot the distribution of standardized first-year GPAs for the 
program group, along with the distribution of first-year GPAs for the comparison group. The plot 
offers first evidence for different student achievement between those two groups within the first 
year: For the program group we observe a clear shift of first-year GPAs to the right. The shift 
indicates that students in the program group have higher first-year GPAs than students in the 
comparison group. The even right shift along the distribution (with the exception of the very right 
tail) suggests that program group students improve their first-year GPA fairly equally along the 
distribution. In contrast to the remarkably consistent shift of the program group’s first-year GPA 
in Panel B, the shift of program group’s second-year GPA in panel C is less steady. At the left 
and at the middle of the distribution we observe that program group students have higher grades 
than comparison group students. At the right tail of the distribution the effect reverses: Program 
group students appear to have lower grades than comparison group students. Nevertheless, the 
strong shift at the middle of the distribution suggests that, on average, program group students 
improve their GPA also in the second year of vocational education. By running multiple 
regressions, we test the robustness of this solely descriptive result. 
 
 
Panel A. —Math GPA Panel B. —First-year GPA   Panel C. —Second-year GPA 
(before treatment)                          (after treatment)            (after treatment) 
 
    
Fig. 1. Regression-adjusted cumulative distribution functions of GPA residuals. Notes: Residuals are computed using a regression 
including school and class controls. While Panel A plots Math GPAs achieved at the end of lower secondary education (before 
participation in PPP), Panels B and C plot average GPAs from the end of the first and second year of vocational education, 
respectively. 
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4. Empirical strategy 
 
To empirically investigate whether students respond to the PPP and, if so, whether their 
response depends on their individual economic preferences, we use the following econometric 
model:  
 
GPAi = β0 + β1 PPPi + β2 ECONPREFi + β3 (PPP   ECONPREF)i + β4 Xi + ui.            (1) 
 
GPAi is the standardized, first-year (second-year) GPA for student i. The main explanatory 
variables in the model are dummies: PPPi is the performance pay program indicator with the 
coefficient β1, which captures the program effect. ECONPREFi indicates a student’s economic 
preference (i.e., degree of risk aversion or time preference). (PPP  ECONPREF)i is the 
interaction term between those dummies with coefficient β3, which captures the interaction effect. 
Significant interaction effects indicate heterogeneous program effects for students with different 
preferences. Xi comprises control variables that cover the three subgroups (personal 
characteristics, ability measurements and company characteristic) as described and displayed in 
section 3 (table 1). We gradually include these subgroup controls to investigate the sensitivity of 
our results and to redress any potential imbalance between the program and comparison groups. 
Our control variables are similar to those used in comparable studies on student achievement (e.g., 
Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Bettinger, 2010). Finally, we include ui, an individual specific standard 
error. For our estimations, we use robust standard errors. 
First, we run estimations to investigate the pure program effect, thus setting the coefficients 
β2 and β3 to zero. In a second step, to examine whether the program effect depends on student 
preferences, we include economic preferences and interaction effects. We examine interaction 
regressions for each economic preference separately. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Baseline program effects on first- and second-year GPA 
We start our analysis of program effects by looking at students’ GPAs in the second and 
fourth semesters, i.e., at the end of the first and second year of vocational education. As only part 
of the students in the first-year sample submitted the survey in the following year, the second-
year sample is lower (by 16%). However, descriptive statistics (at the bottom of table 1) indicate 
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that participation in the second-year sample is not related to participation in the PPP. Focusing 
purely on the program effect on the first- and second-year GPAs, we conduct regressions of a 
short version of equation (1), i.e., we omit controls for economic preferences and their 
interactions with the PPP. We report four specifications. The first specification controls only for 
schools and school classes. We augment this specification by gradually including control 
variables that refer to the same set of subgroups as described in table 1—student characteristics 
(specification 2), ability measurements (specification 3) and company size (specification 4).  
In sum, we find a statistically significant and positive effect of the existence of PPPs on 
students’ first- and second-year GPAs. Carrying out separate analysis by the two occupational 
subgroups, we find that program effects differ between students in technical and commercial 
occupations. For students in technical occupations, our results indicate a statistically significant 
and highly positive program effect on student performance. In contrast, for students in 
commercial occupations, the program effect is non-significant and almost zero. As the actual 
participation in a PPP is low for students in the commercial subgroup (14 of 116 students), 
existing evidence is sufficiently inconclusive for rejecting the hypothesis that there is no program 
effect. The rest of this subsection examines these results in more detail. 
Estimation results for the full first- (and second-) year sample (table 2; columns 1 to 4) 
indicate that students in the program and comparison groups differ in their school performance. 
Controlling for school and school classes only, we find that the treatment group’s GPA is on 
average 0.349 (0.386) standard deviations higher than the comparison group’s GPA (table 2, 
column 1). This difference is statistically significant (p<0.05). After we control for student 
characteristics and ability measurements, the program coefficient increases marginally in size. 
The significance of the coefficient remains robust across these specifications (table 2, columns 2 
and 3). With the inclusion of the variable “company size” in column 4, the size of the coefficient 
decreases and its standard error increases. Nevertheless, the difference in student performance 
between the two groups remains significant (p<0.05 for the first-year sample; p<0.10 for the 
second-year sample). These results indicate that, on average, program group students have 
significantly higher GPAs than comparison group students. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: First-year GPA
Performance Pay 0.349** 0.376** 0.380** 0.356** 0.642*** 0.651*** 0.630*** 0.545*** -0.047 -0.013 0.035 -0.013
[0.155] [0.153] [0.147] [0.157] [0.178] [0.176] [0.182] [0.191] [0.249] [0.256] [0.223] [0.265]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x x x
Company characteristic x x x
R-squared 0.212 0.259 0.334 0.361 0.444 0.460 0.482 0.521 0.062 0.160 0.291 0.350
Number of observations
% PPP
Panel B: Second-year GPA
Performance Pay 0.386** 0.407** 0.414** 0.358* 0.614** 0.625** 0.648*** 0.529** -0.029 -0.012 -0.045 -0.088
[0.184] [0.187] [0.187] [0.197] [0.237] [0.240] [0.242] [0.262] [0.276] [0.283] [0.238] [0.288]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x x x
Company characteristic x x x
R-squared 0.141 0.159 0.191 0.215 0.162 0.172 0.176 0.260 0.116 0.155 0.256 0.289
Number of observations
% PPP
Table 2
Program impact on standardized first- and second-year GPAs.
Notes: The table reports regression estimates of the program effect on grade point averages (GPA) from the end of the first (2010) and second year (2011) of vocational education, 
respectively. GPAs are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels are indicated as follows: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Full Sample Technical Occupations Commercial Occupations
33%
200 84
61% 12%
116
167
28% 50% 11%
72 95
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However, separate analysis by occupational subgroups show fundamental differences in 
program effects between students in technical occupations (table 2, columns 5 to 8) and students 
in commercial occupations (table 2, columns 9 to 12). Whereas we find a strong and significant 
program effect on student performance in technical occupations, the program effect on student 
performance in commercial occupations is non-significant and almost zero (in most cases, 
slightly negative). For students in commercial occupations we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
there is no program effect: Unfortunately, data are inconclusive in this case because only 14 of 
the 116 students participate in a PPP (in the first-year sample). Therefore, a larger sample size 
would be needed to provide conclusive evidence on program effects for students in commercial 
occupations. PPPs are more prevalent in technical occupations (51 of 84 students participate in a 
PPP in the first-year sample) for which we find a largely positive and significant program effect: 
When we control only for school and school classes (table 2, columns 5), the estimated first-year 
(second-year) GPA is 0.642 (0.614) standard deviations higher for students in the program than 
for students in the comparison group. The size of the coefficient remains fairly robust across 
specifications with the largest decrease in specification four to an effect size of 0.545 (0.529) 
standard deviations. The coefficient is statistically significant across specifications (p<0.01 for 
the first-year sample and p<0.05 for the second-year sample). 
The highly positive program effect on student performance in technical occupations is both 
interesting and surprising. The positive sign of the coefficient meets the expectations drawn from 
standard human capital theory. With the provision of additional benefits, the investment in human 
capital increases (holding other factors fixed). But why do students in technical occupations 
respond extremely strongly to the PPP in comparison to low incentive effects found in the 
previous literature? Assuming that the differences between technical and commercial are real, we 
can think of three explanations.
16
 First, our data indicate that students in technical occupations 
place generally a higher value on pecuniary rewards (as compared to students in commercial 
occupations, the only available reference group). Students in technical occupations not only 
attach greater importance to their potential wage after graduation but also appear less satisfied 
with their current apprentice wage (in both the first and second year of vocational education). 
Therefore, students in technical occupations might place a high value on gaining the offered 
reward. Second, our data suggest that students in technical occupations (as opposed to 
commercial occupations) are significantly less interested in continuing their career in the 
                                                        
16 Differences reported in this section are statistically significant (at least at p<0.10). 
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occupation for which they are currently investing the training. As the human capital investment in 
the current occupation might not be directly linked with labor market benefits in a different 
occupation, students in technical occupations might place a low value on the long-term labor 
market benefits of better student performance but a relatively high value on the short-term reward 
offered by the PPP. Third, students in technical occupations have relatively high discounting rates 
as compared to those students in commercial occupations. The following subsection will show 
that students with a lower willingness or ability to postpone the acquisition of rewards respond 
more strongly to the PPP.  
 
5.2 Heterogeneous program effects by time preferences 
In this section, we assess the significance of students’ time preferences by investigating 
whether the effect of the PPP on student performance interacts with students’ time preferences. In 
table 3, we present estimates of equation (1), replacing ECONPREF by time preference dummies 
that take the value 1 if a student is highly impatient and 0 otherwise. Highly impatient students 
are less willing to tolerate delay. We report results for the two impatience dummies as defined 
and described in the descriptive section. The dummies differ by the percentile of students defined 
as being impatient: Whereas the first impatience dummy refers to students who are impatient on 
the 10
th
 percentile in both choice sets, the second impatience dummy is broader, referring to 
students who are impatient on the 25
th
 percentile in both choice sets (see descriptive statistics for 
more details). As in the previous result section, we report regression results for the first- and 
second-year sample, using specifications identical to those reported in Table 2. 
We begin by describing results for the program and the interaction effect on the first-year 
GPA (table 3, panel A). Controlling for the 10
th 
percentile impatience dummy, we find that 
relatively patient students (as opposed to non-patient students) who work for a host company 
with a PPP increase their first-year GPA by about 0.244 standard deviations (table 3, column 1). 
This effect is marginally significant (p=.122). The coefficient remains marginally significant for 
specifications 2 and 3 (p=.111 and p=.102, respectively). If we instead include the 25
th
 percentile 
impatience dummy, the program effect increases marginally in size in each of the specification 
(table 3, columns 5 to 8). Significance levels remain the same as for the 10
th
 percentile 
impatience dummy. In sum, the program effect for relatively patient students is, if at all, only 
marginally significant.  
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A look at the program effect for highly impatient students shows that the coefficient of 
greatest interest—the interaction term between being part of the PPP and being impatient—is 
positive, indicating that highly impatient students respond more strongly to the program than 
relatively patient students (table 3, panel A, row 3). The coefficient is significant at the 1% level 
(table 3, columns 3 and 4), controlling for the 10
th
 percentile impatience dummy and significant 
at the 10% level (table 3, columns 3 and 4), controlling for the 25
th 
percentile impatience dummy. 
The effect size of the interaction is high and varies between 0.585 and 1.271 standard deviations 
(table 3, columns 1 to 8).  
For the second-year sample the performance pay effect increases in both size and 
significance for patient students, especially when controlling for the broader 25
th 
percentile 
impatience dummy (table 3, panel B, row 1). The interaction effect remains significant (although 
at lower significance levels than for the first year sample) for the 10
th 
percentile impatience 
dummy but is no longer significant for the 25
th 
percentile impatience dummy (table 3, row 3).  
Overall, we find that relatively impatient students increase their GPA more than patient 
students, especially in their first year of education. This result supports our hypothesis. First, 
short-term financial incentives boost perceived marginal benefits from increased student 
performance, especially for relatively impatient students who highly discount long-term benefits 
from increased learning effort. Second, the relative value of the financial incentives shrinks when 
real, relatively high labor market benefits approach. The second argument might explain why the 
difference in response to the incentive between relatively impatient and patient student is less 
pronounced in the second year. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that other 
mechanisms (such as positive spillover effects) might also play a role. 
Our findings thus suggest that incentive programs constitute an effective tool, particularly 
for increasing the performance of students who are less willing to postpone the acquisition of a 
reward. If impatient students are more likely to respond to financial incentives, offering short-
term rewards at the very beginning of an educational program, when long-term benefits of 
increased student performance are discounted over a higher amount of years, would be most 
appropriate. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: First-year GPA
Performance Pay 0.244+ 0.249+ 0.245+ 0.226 0.248+ 0.269+ 0.258+ 0.247
[0.157] [0.156] [0.149] [0.162] [0.167] [0.165] [0.160] [0.175]
Impatient (dummy) -0.169 -0.304 -0.416+ -0.427+ 0.066 0.023 -0.060 -0.065
[0.315] [0.312] [0.264] [0.263] [0.244] [0.244] [0.229] [0.216]
PPP * impatient (interaction) 0.978** 1.163*** 1.271*** 1.202*** 0.585+ 0.608+ 0.709* 0.646*
[0.399] [0.405] [0.360] [0.379] [0.365] [0.374] [0.360] [0.361]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x
Company characteristic x x
R-squared 0.233 0.284 0.362 0.384 0.229 0.274 0.350 0.373
Number of observations
Panel B: Second-year GPA
Performance Pay 0.304+ 0.313+ 0.310+ 0.256 0.398** 0.420** 0.418** 0.363*
[0.192] [0.194] [0.194] [0.209] [0.197] [0.201] [0.201] [0.212]
Impatient (dummy) -0.224 -0.266 -0.287 -0.342 0.131 0.140 0.103 0.058
[0.334] [0.327] [0.304] [0.324] [0.268] [0.275] [0.267] [0.263]
PPP * impatient (interaction) 0.722+ 0.813* 0.890** 0.865* -0.047 -0.063 -0.008 -0.013
[0.452] [0.450] [0.440] [0.469] [0.426] [0.428] [0.438] [0.432]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x
Company characteristic x x
R-squared 0.151 0.171 0.205 0.228 0.143 0.161 0.193 0.216
Number of observations
200 200
Table 3
Heterogeneous program effect by time preferences.
Notes: The table reports regression estimates of the program effect on  grade point averages (GPA) from the end of first (2010) 
and second year (2011) of vocational education, respectively. GPAs are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. The first (second) impatient dummy refers to students who are impatient at the 10th (25th) percentile in both 
choice sets. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, + p<0.15
167 167
Impatient defined as 10% percentiles Impatient defined as 25% percentiles
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5.3 Heterogeneous program effects by risk preferences 
In this section, we explore the importance of students’ risk preferences by analyzing 
whether relatively risk loving students (as opposed to risk averse or risk neutral students) respond 
differently to the PPP. Table 4 presents estimation results of equation (1), in which we include 
the risk loving dummy representing a student’s economic preference (ECONPREF). Risk loving 
equals 1 if a student prefers the lottery option even though its expected value is lower than the 
certainty equivalent and 0 otherwise. The interaction effect of receiving performance pay and 
being risk loving provides a measure of whether the program effect depends on students’ risk 
preference.  
For relatively risk averse students, we find a significant average program effect on first-
year (second-year) GPA of 0.524 (0.535) standard deviation when we control only for school and 
school classes (table 4, columns 1 and 5). This effect remains statistically significant and high in 
size for all specifications, indicating that relatively risk averse students respond positively to the 
financial incentives.  
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Performance Pay 0.524*** 0.571*** 0.543*** 0.525*** 0.535** 0.569** 0.560** 0.498**
[0.192] [0.186] [0.180] [0.193] [0.230] [0.227] [0.222] [0.235]
Risk-loving (dummy) 0.026 0.113 0.117 0.127 0.052 0.099 0.073 0.050
[0.180] [0.184] [0.177] [0.179] [0.207] [0.212] [0.210] [0.206]
PPP * risk-loving (interaction) -0.389 -0.453+ -0.381+ -0.394+ -0.349 -0.391 -0.351 -0.329
[0.271] [0.277] [0.258] [0.262] [0.325] [0.332] [0.326] [0.338]
School and class dummies x x x x x x x x
Student characteristics x x x x x x
Ability measurements x x x x
Company characteristic x x
R-squared 0.222 0.269 0.341 0.368 0.147 0.166 0.197 0.220
Number of observations
Table 4
Notes: The table reports regression estimates of the program effect on  grade point averages (GPA) from the end of first (2010) 
and second year (2011) of vocational education, respectively. GPAs are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. Risk-loving is a dummy which equals 1 if a student prefers the lottery option although its expected value is lower 
than the certainty equivalent and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, 
+ p<0.15
Dep. Var.: First-year GPA Dep. Var.: Second-year GPA
Heterogeneous program effect by risk preferences.
200 167
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The interaction term between being part of the PPP and being risk loving is negative for 
both the first- and second-year samples (among all specifications, see table 4, row 3). The 
negative interaction term suggests that risk loving students respond less well to the PPP than 
relatively risk averse students. The size of the interaction term changes only marginally across the 
specifications from -0.394 standard deviations for the first-year sample to -0.329 for the second-
year sample (table 4, columns 4 and 8). However, the statistical significance of the interaction 
term is either nonexistent or very weak. Although we find slightly significant results for the first-
year sample (.103<p<.142), the interaction term appears not to be significant for the second-year 
sample.  
The large reduction of the program effect among risk loving program group students (as 
compared to their relatively more risk averse counterparts) is interesting. Although we do not find 
statistically significant interaction effects (with p<0.10), the high reduction in response to the 
incentive might indicate lower program effects among risk loving students. This indication would 
be in line with our hypothesis: With the provision of financial incentives the relative certainty of 
monetary benefits increases and relatively risk averse students would have higher incentives to 
devote more time and energy to the learning investment. In sum, however, we can only speculate 
about whether students’ difference in risk preferences causes heterogeneous program effects.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study has been twofold. First, we aimed at learning more about the 
potential effects of performance pay programs offered in upper secondary vocational education. 
Second, we investigated systematic differences in program effects among students with 
heterogeneous economic preferences, i.e., with heterogeneous time and risk preferences. To 
conduct the research empirically, we analyzed a unique dataset combining educational data, 
which includes real labor market incentive programs, with data from economic experiments. To 
test the robustness of our results and to redress any potential imbalance between program and 
comparison groups, we ran different model specifications. 
We find that the existence of the PPPs has on average a positive and significant effect on 
students’ first- and second-year GPAs. This positive program effect is driven by a statistically 
significant and high effect for the subgroup of students in technical occupations. Conversely, for 
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students in commercial occupations, the program effect is almost zero. As only a very small 
fraction of students in the latter subgroup is actually part of a PPP, our data do not allow us to 
reject the hypothesis that there is no program effect for students in commercial occupations.  
Most importantly, we find that the responsiveness to the program depends on differences in 
student preferences. For time preferences, we find that highly impatient students in particular 
respond strongly to the incentive program by increasing their GPA more than relatively patient 
students. For risk preferences, our results are less conclusive: We can only speculate that risk 
loving students might respond less well to the incentive than relatively risk averse students. These 
two results are in line with our theoretical predictions derived from human capital theory. Long 
run benefits from higher student performance, i.e., advantageous labor market outcomes, can be 
derived only with a considerable time lag and with a high uncertainty. With the provision of 
short-term financial incentives, part of the investment benefits can be reaped much closer to the 
investment and with a relatively higher certainty.  
As to the best of our knowledge there exists no evidence on heterogeneous program effects 
by students’ economic preferences in previous research on the effects of financial incentives in 
education, we are the first to show the importance of taking a closer look at the interaction of 
financial incentives and students’ economic preferences. The finding that financial incentives in 
education particularly target highly impatient students—for whom the added benefit accounts for 
a difference in the perceived return to higher student performance—gives us a hint of when 
providing financial incentives might be most effective. As graduation approaches, the perceived 
value of real labor market benefits increases and the perceived added value of financial incentives 
decreases. Therefore, we suggest that the provision of financial incentives might be most 
effective at the beginning of an educational program. 
Our evidence is based on a small sample of students and results might be specific to the 
underlying performance pay programs. Therefore, drawing a more general conclusion from our 
findings calls for further research in both the same and different educational environments. 
Identifying students who most likely respond to financial incentives will not only help target 
incentives to a tighter range of students but also provide them at the right time—both of which 
would increase the cost effectiveness of performance pay programs in education. 
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